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Abstract— A new scale was developed to measure trait 
neuroticism and state worry about bodily signals (the BSAWS). 
72 British participants were recruited to complete a heartbeat 
counting task and then a battery of questionnaires comprising of 
the BSAWS, the state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI), the emotion 
regulation questionnaire (ERQ) and the paranoid checklist (PC) 
and state social paranoia scales (SSPS).  Confirmatory factor 
analysis supported a four-factor model of the BSAWS, with 
factors of ‘trait neuroticism’, ‘trait unconcern’, ‘state 
mindfulness’ and ‘state worry’.  These results broadly support a 
two–dimensional model of bodily signals’ attention and worry.  
Correlational analyses showed concurrent validity of the BSAWS 
construct with other previously established measures of anxiety, 
paranoia and emotional regulation.  Applications for the scale 
include measurement of attention and worry during different 
tasks and/or behaviours, with the potential for clinical use to 
study the aetiology of various body-related mental health 
disorders. 
Keywords-trait neuroticism, worry, bodily signals, health 
anxiety, interoception, state anxiety, paranoia 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recurrent, negative thoughts are an important feature of 
anxiety disorders. These recurrent and persistent negative 
thoughts are usually defined as worry. Worry can be described 
as an apprehensive expectation of possible negative outcomes 
in future events [1]. Worry is also conceptualized as an 
effective short-term response to uncertainty that can become 
self-perpetuating and anxiety maintaining with adverse long-
term consequences [2]. Worry reduces subjective uncertainty, 
contributes to a sense of vigilance and preparedness, dampens 
autonomic arousal, and fuels the belief that uncertain events 
and overall risk can be controlled [2].  When such relief is 
coupled with the likely non-occurrence of low-probability 
feared events (in this case, a problematic health condition, e.g. 
arrhythmia), it can powerfully reinforce the worry response, 
shaping beliefs that worry is adaptive and can prevent bad 
things from happening. Worry is also a form of emotional 
suppression and cognitive avoidance that becomes self-
perpetuating, in part because it blocks other emotions such as 
fear or anger [2] and provides an illusion of control. 
 
Trait Neuroticism and Worry: General and Specific to Bodily 
Signals 
 
There is evidence in the literature to suggest that worry is a 
manifestation of the dispositional trait of neuroticism, believed 
to reflect the general predisposition to develop 
psychopathological symptoms such as anxiety and depression 
[3]. The personality trait of neuroticism refers to relatively 
stable tendencies to respond with negative emotions to 
perceived threat, frustration, or loss. Individuals in the 
population vary markedly on this trait.  Some individuals may 
exhibit frequent and intense emotional reactions to minor 
challenges, whereas others may respond with little emotional 
reaction even in the face of significant difficulties [4].  
Individuals who score high on neuroticism respond more 
poorly to stressors, are more likely to interpret ordinary 
situations and stimuli as threatening, minor frustrations as 
hopelessly difficult and are more prone as well to develop 
anxiety and depressive disorders [5]. Unsurprisingly then, there 
is accumulating evidence demonstrating that worry is indeed 
linked to neuroticism [6,7]. More recently, a study has  found 
that worry mediates the relationship between neuroticism and 
anxiety, meaning that worry is a cognitive coping mechanism 
that is typical of neurotic traits and may act as a way of 
anticipating and controlling for threat, both internal (e.g. body 
signals) and external (e.g. social threat, such as criticisms) [8]. 
 
Cognitive models of health anxiety [2,9,10] have long 
proposed that certain individuals have a persistent concern 
about their health.  Within these models, individuals 
experiencing this form of anxiety, worry about the possibility 
of having a serious health condition because they have an 
enduring tendency to misinterpret bodily variations and body 
sensations or any other health related information. When worry 
is specific to one’s health and this is persistent and severe then 
clinically speaking this is referred to as hypochondriasis 
[10,11].  Research has established that links exist between 
neuroticism and hypochondriasis and health anxiety [12]. For 
example a study has found that 29% of hypochondriacal 
concerns in a non-clinical population were accounted for by 
neuroticism [12]. This means that neuroticism may act as a 
predisposition trait factor for both health anxiety and 
hypochondriasis. 
Health anxiety is conceptualised as lying in a continuum. 
On the one hand individuals may possess relatively normal, 
non-clinical concerns about their own health, and on the other 
hand others may possess a severe and persistent worry about 
their own health without evidence to support these exacerbated 
concerns [13]. Concerning the measurement of health anxiety, 
a commonly-used measure is the Health Anxiety Inventory 
(HAI) [13]. According to the authors the HAI is one of the few 
self-report measures capable of discriminating between 
individuals that meet the clinical criteria for hypochondriasis, 
and those for whom health anxiety is present but not severe, 
such that they do not meet the clinical criteria for 
hypochondriasis. The Health Anxiety Inventory has been tested 
in clinical populations in three studies, and the authors reported 
excellent psychometric properties for this measure. Moreover, 
the state version of the HAI was also found to be sensitive to 
treatment effects and able to detect changes in thinking over 
time [13]. 
In this article, the authors describe the development of a 
new measure of general trait neuroticism and specific worry 
about body signals that draws conceptually from the Health 
Anxiety Inventory [13].  This measure is novel in two key 
ways.  Firstly, although the literature on health anxiety has 
been fairly prolific at developing measures of general health 
concerns (e.g. the Illness Attitudes Scale) [13,14], there are a 
lack of measures flexible enough to be used across different 
contexts to measure persistent worries and concerns about a 
range of different body signals (such as changes in heart rate or 
respiration) or activities (for example eating or exercise). Such 
a scale has the potential for great utility within the study of the 
aetiology of health anxiety and hypochondriasis. Cognitive 
theories of anxiety have established that anxious thoughts and 
worry about body signals derive from errors of thinking such as 
catastrophizing or making erroneous inferences without 
sufficient evidence to do so [15]. These errors of thinking 
appear to facilitate an anxious schema that can act as a lens to 
magnify threat (both internal and external).  This maladaptive 
schema may then in turn contribute to anxious and threatening 
interpretations of internal stimuli.  Incorporating measurements 
of worry about bodily signals in specific contexts or during 
specific tasks, alongside trait measures, can therefore help shed 
light on how moment-to-moment experience, relates to 
longstanding dispositions to think and feel in certain ways. 
In addition, this measure will be novel in that it will move 
away from the general and state health anxiety constructs.  It 
will instead adopt a circumplex model similar to circumplex 
models of affect [16].This will be a two dimensional model of 
general trait tendencies and specific concerns exploring 
specifically the general negative concerns about body signals 
and tendency to be neurotic about one’s body signals and the 
negative thoughts or concerns that one is reporting in regards to 
a specific task, activity or body signal (in this case worry about 
heartbeat sensation), see Fig. 1. A bidimensional model with 
two dimensions: context (trait vs. state) and valence (positivity 
vs. negativity)  is proposed as basis for the new measure of trait 
and neurotic concern about bodily signals and worry about 
specific bodily signals because there is an established link 
between neuroticism, worry and hypochondriasis [12]. In 
contrast to this,  mindfulness, as the state non-judgemental 
awareness and acceptance of the body experiences [17] has 
been found to be inversely related with worry, neuroticism and 
negative affect [18,19]. As such it is expected that this new 
measure should produce positively and strongly related 
dimensions of trait neuroticism and worry about specific bodily 
signals. 
Worry and Emotional Regulation of Body Experiences 
It is proposed that a measure that taps into general and 
specific concerns about physical sensations should draw from 
previous research that looks not only at the links between 
neuroticism and worry [8] but also at the links between 
neuroticism, affect related emotional regulation and stress [20]. 
Emotional regulation is a concept involving a set of 
processes that allow the individual to influence the emotions 
that they are experiencing, when they occur and how to 
understand and express these emotions [21]. Individuals often 
increase, maintain and decrease both negative and positive 
emotions [22]. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Circumplex Model of the Body Signals and Attention Worry Sub-
scales 
There are many cases where emotional regulation occurs in 
a conscious way, for example changing a topic when it 
becomes upsetting, however emotional regulation may occur 
unconsciously, for example when one immediately moves 
attention away from something upsetting [22]. Another 
important element of emotional regulation is that 
fundamentally, it is neither good nor bad [23]. 
Researchers [22,23] have established two common 
emotional regulation strategies: emotional reappraisal and 
suppression.  These strategies aim to either decrease, or 
increase emotional response tendencies or affective states [21].  
Cognitive reappraisal is a type of cognitive change, and thus 
antecedent focused. Reappraisal helps the individual to 
reinterpret emotional stimuli, in an unemotional way [21]. 
Suppression on the other hand, acts as a prevention of 
unwanted emotional processes, during a state of emotional 
arousal by reducing emotion-expressive behaviour [21] for 
example such as the act of ‘holding a poker face’ when 
gambling. Research has demonstrated that both the suppression 
and reappraisal of emotional stimuli reduces negative affect.  
Both strategies have been shown to be effective, as brain areas 
that are associated with emotional processing were highly 
activated during the use of suppression strategies [21]. 
Furthermore, researchers observed physiological responses that 
were also present when the emotional networks were highly 
active, such as that skin conductance was greater, indicating 
that emotional regulation is effective for both physical and 
psychological components [24]. 
There is research to suggest that individuals higher in 
neuroticism are more likely to experience worry in cognitively 
demanding situations, to improve performance and to have 
impaired cognitive reappraisal by demonstrating a trait 
congruent and emotionally charged appraisal of situations, 
which means perceiving situations in a negative and 
emotionally charged way [20]. Research has also revealed that 
cognitive reappraisal can replace negative stress with positive 
stress. Some studies have suggested that individuals who self-
report greater use of reappraisal in their day to day life may 
experience more adaptive social and emotional outcomes [25]. 
Studies conducted through field, laboratory and clinical 
settings have shown that cognitive reappraisal is a highly 
effective emotional regulation technique and has been linked 
with positive affect [25]. 
This literature thus suggests that cognitive reappraisal is 
associated with less negative affect and worry and on the other 
hand affect–based emotion regulation strategies are associated 
not only to neuroticism but to more negative affect and worry. 
As such, it is expected that in this new measure of trait 
neuroticism about bodily signals and worry specific to a body 
signal, the scores of worry specific to a body signal as well as 
trait neuroticism about body signals will both show a positive 
relationship with state negative affect. 
Worry and Non-clinical Paranoia and Anxiety 
Paranoia (unfounded ideas of deliberate harm from others) 
is a key component of psychotic experience. Recent research in 
paranoia has advocated for a continuum between experiences 
of paranoia that are built upon common interpersonal concerns 
(such as being accepted by others or being at risk of being 
ostracised and harmed by others) at one end of the continuum 
and the development of psychotic persecutory delusions at the 
severe end of the continuum [26]. Cognitive models of 
paranoia [26]  have long proposed that paranoia may be related 
to anomalous perception of both internal and external signals 
and stimuli and that non-clinical paranoia shares 
commonalities with non-clinical anxiety.  Both are related to an 
anticipation of threat or danger and both are associated with 
worry since worry is characterised by constant intrusive 
thoughts about possible dangers [27].  Indeed, studies with a 
non-clinical population have found that anxiety, worry, and 
depression predict the occurrence of non-clinical persecutory 
ideation in an experimental situation [27, 28]. Moreover a 
longitudinal study with the general population was able to 
establish that insomnia, worry, anxiety and depression were 
strong predictors both of the development and the persistence 
of paranoid thinking [27]. 
Since non-clinical paranoia shares commonalities with 
anxiety and is associated with worry, it is expected that when 
we measure worry about specific body signals, this will be 
significantly associated with both non-clinical paranoid and 
anxious thoughts. This is because individuals in the general 
population that report non-clinical paranoid thoughts have a 
tendency to worry about body sensations and usually report 
atypical experiences that have to do with a sense that ‘things 
don’t seem and don’t feel right’, i.e. a sense of anomaly, which 
leads to constant worry about their physical and mental well-
being [28]. 
Aims of Study 
1. To develop a scale to measure context dependent (trait 
versus state) and valenced (positivity versus negativity) 
appraisals of bodily signals. 
 
2. Develop sub–scales that will measure worry and 
mindfulness during a specific task, in this instance, a 
heartbeat-counting task. 
II. METHOD 
Participants 
72 participants (58 female and 13 male) were recruited from 
the De Montfort University undergraduate population.  
Participants were rewarded course credit in return for 
participation.  The mean age of participants was 21.63 years 
(SD = 6.16 years). One participant declined to report their age 
and gender.  Participants were asked if they had been 
previously diagnosed with a psychiatric condition.  5 
participants responded that they had.  21 participants declined 
to state whether they had or had not. There were no 
statistically significant differences between the participants 
that reported being diagnosed with a psychiatric condition and 
the participants that did not report having a psychiatric 
condition for the BSAWS and the other psychological 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
Instruments 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) [29] 
Participants were asked how they currently felt by using the 
items in the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (20 items). Positive 
affect was measured by 10 items that evaluate current feeling 
of positive emotions (e.g. I am relaxed), whereas negative 
affect was measured by 10 items that evaluate current feeling 
of negative emotions (e.g. I feel nervous). Each item is rated on 
a 4 point scale (1=Not at all, 4=Very much so). The reliability 
was high for both subscales in the current study, with 
Cronbach’s α = .92 for positive affect and Cronbach’s α = .90 
for negative affect. The score of each subscale was calculated 
by totalling the ratings of positive or negative feelings, with the 
range being 10 to 40 for each subscale. A higher score 
indicated stronger state feeling of positive or negative emotions 
respectively. 
The Body Signals Attention and Worry Scale (BSAWS) 
The Body Signals Attention and Worry Scale (BSAWS) was 
devised with the intent to measure on the one hand trait health 
concerns and worry about body signals and on the other hand 
to measure state personal experiences of body cues during a 
specific task or behaviour, in this instance a heartbeat-
counting task. Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale (ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly 
agree) how much they agreed with 14 statements, measuring 
four factors.  The four factors were adopted to support a 
circumplex models of affect, that considers emotions as 
valenced and both context-dependent and trait-determined. 
The first factor, trait neuroticism about bodily signals, was 
composed of 3 items that measured the general worry 
associated with bodily signals. One example item is “If I feel 
any discomfort I start to worry that something might be 
wrong”.  A higher score indicates trait tendency to be 
hypochondriac. The second factor, trait unconcern about 
bodily signals, was composed of 4 items, which measured the 
behaviour of deemphasising the importance of bodily signals. 
One example item is “If I have a bodily sensation I rarely 
wonder what it means”.  A higher score on this dimension 
indicates a lesser tendency to worry about bodily signals. The 
third factor, state worry (about heartbeat signals), was 
composed of 4 items that measure anxiety to specific bodily 
sensations in the moment. One example item is “When I was 
counting my heartbeats all sorts of negative thoughts went 
through my mind”. A higher score on this subscale indicates 
more distress associated with performing the heartbeat 
counting task. The fourth factor, state mindfulness (to 
heartbeat signals), was composed of 3 items, which measured 
the enhanced calm associated with observing internally the 
bodily signal during the (heartbeat counting) task. One 
example item is “Listening to my heart enabled me to focus on 
the moment”. A higher score on this subscale indicates better 
concentration and focus associated with feeling bodily signals. 
 
Emotional Regulation Questionnaire [30]  
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire is an established 
10-item self-report questionnaire measuring two commonly 
used strategies, cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression. The cognitive reappraisal subscale was used in the 
current study.  Participants were again asked to respond on a 7-
point Likert scale, (ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 
7=strongly agree). The cognitive reappraisal subscale is 
comprised of 6 items and one example is “I control my 
emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m 
in”. A total score was calculated by summing the ratings of the 
six items (ranged 6-42), and a higher score indicates that 
cognitive reappraisal is more habitually used. The scale has 
been widely used in research and the internal reliability of the 
scale was high in the current study with Cronbach’s α = .89. 
Paranoia Checklist (PC) [31] 
 
The PC is an 18-item self-report multidimensional scale 
developed to measure paranoid ideation. Items range from 
more common thoughts about interpersonal concerns e.g. 
“There might be negative comments being circulated about 
me” and the possibility of a threat posed by others e.g. “I need 
to be on my guard against others” to delusional thoughts of 
thought control e.g. “I can detect coded messages about me in 
the press/TV/radio” and of conspiracy e.g. “There is a 
possibility of a conspiracy against me”. Each item is rated on 
5-point Likert scales for frequency, degree of conviction, and 
distress and the scale has excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α > 0.90) and good convergent validity. The 
original PC was found to have the following Cronbach’s 
alphas: 0.89 (frequency), 0.95 (conviction) and 0.95 (distress). 
The measure when used within this study also showed 
excellent reliability with Cronbach's alphas of .94 (frequency), 
.93 (conviction) and .96 (distress). 
 
State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS) [32] 
 
This scale measures state social paranoia. The scale has ten 
persecutory items (e.g. ‘Someone stared at me in order to 
upset me’; ‘Someone was trying to isolate me’; ‘Someone was 
trying to make me distressed’), each rated on a 5-point scale. 
The items conform to a recent definition of persecutory 
ideation. Higher scores on the scale indicate greater levels of 
persecutory thinking. The scale has been regarded to provide 
excellent internal reliability, adequate test–retest reliability, 
convergent validity with both independent interviewer ratings 
and self-report measures, and divergent validity with regard to 
measures of positive and neutral thinking. Previous research 
indicated a high internal reliability for the questionnaire 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.90) [32]. The Cronbach’s α in this study for 
the scale was .80. 
 
Procedure 
 
Testing took place in the research cubicles at De Montfort 
University, under controlled conditions.  Informed consent was 
provided by all participants, who were reminded of their rights 
to withdraw, and to anonymity and confidentiality of their data.  
Participants undertook a short task lasting less than five 
TABLE I.  UNSTANDARDISED LOADINGS, STANDARD ERRORS AND STANDARDISED LOADINGS FOR 4-FACTOR CONFIRMATORY MODEL OF BSAWS 
 
Factors Items 
Unstandardised 
Loading 
Standard 
Error 
Standardised 
Loading 
p 
Trait 
Neuroticism 
about Bodily 
Signals 
When I feel physical discomfort or pain, I become upset 1.00 -- 0.61 -- 
If I feel any discomfort I start to worry that something might be wrong 1.21 0.21 0.82 *** 
If I notice an unexplained bodily sensation I always find it difficult to 
think of other things 
1.22 0.22 0.81 *** 
Trait 
Unconcern 
about Bodily 
Signals 
I do not notice physical tension or discomfort until it becomes severe 1.00 -- 0.61 -- 
I am not afraid of serious illness 1.07 0.27 0.68 *** 
I can notice an unpleasant bodily sensation without worrying about it 0.99 0.26 0.62 *** 
If I have a bodily sensation I rarely wonder what it means 0.96 0.24 0.67 *** 
State Worry 
about 
Heartbeat 
Signal 
I felt that something was wrong when counting my heartbeat 1.00 -- 0.75 -- 
When I was counting my heartbeats all sorts of negative thoughts went 
through my mind 
0.84 0.15 0.70 *** 
When I was sensing my heartbeats I thought that I may have a serious 
health condition 
0.49 0.09 0.72 *** 
I felt distressed and confused when counting my heartbeat 0.68 0.12 0.71 *** 
State 
Mindfulness 
about 
Heartbeat 
Signal 
I felt relaxed and calm when counting my heartbeat 1.00 -- 0.72 -- 
Listening to my heart enabled me to focus on the moment 0.90 0.20 0.66 *** 
When counting my heartbeats I felt I was in tune with my body 0.97 0.22 0.76 *** 
***p < .005 
 
minutes, in which they were asked to sit quietly and count their 
heartbeats. Participants then completed the BSAWS, followed 
by the other self-report scales, by hand. All participants were 
then debriefed and thanked for their time. 
III. RESULTS 
Model evaluations were examined by Chi Square Statistics 
and accompanying significance tests. The Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis Model of the BSAWS showed a χ2 (df = 72) = 94.14, 
p = 0.041. Goodness of fit indices reported are the Root Mean 
Square of Approximation (RMSEA) and the Comparative 
Fitness Index (CFI). The model was considered to fit the data 
well with a CFI of .92 and RSMEA of .066.  The standardized 
and unstandardized loadings of the four factor model of the 
BSAWS are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Reliability 
 
Reliability was established by examining the Cronbach’s α of 
the four factors of the model of the BSAWS. The State Worry 
factor showed a Cronbach’s α of .77 with 4 items; the State 
Mindfulness factor showed a Cronbach’s α of .76 with 3 items; 
the Trait Neuroticism factor showed a Cronbach’s α of .75 
with 3 items and finally the Trait Unconcern showed a 
Cronbach’s α of .74 with 4 items. The Trait Neuroticism 
correlated significantly with state worry (r = .48, p < .001), 
which supports previous literature examining the association 
between trait neuroticism and state worry [6].  
 
Validity 
 
Concurrent validity was established by looking at correlations 
between the four factors of the BSAWS with state negative 
affect and state positive affect, the emotional reappraisal and 
the dimensions of paranoid ideation (frequency, conviction 
and distress) and state social paranoia. As expected State 
Negative Emotion was associated with State Worry (r = .41, p 
< .001) and Trait Neuroticism (r = .39, p = .001) of the 
BSAWS. Moreover, positive correlations were observed 
between Trait Unconcern and State Mindfulness of the 
BSAWS with Cognitive Reappraisal (r = .29, p = .037; r = .39, 
p = .005). Finally, Trait Neuroticism and State Worry showed 
strong positive correlations with both trait and state paranoia 
(see Table 2). 
DISCUSSION 
The items of the BSAWS scale loaded on to a four factor 
model with factors of ‘Trait Neuroticism’, ‘Trait Unconcern’, 
‘State Mindfulness’ and ‘State Worry’.  These results broadly 
support a two–dimensional model of bodily signals attention 
and worry, with dimensions of context (i.e. trait versus state) 
and valence (i.e. positivity versus negativity).  These 
dimensions are in accord with circumplex models of affect 
which similarly consider emotions as valenced and both 
context-dependent and trait-determined [16].  In addition, 
correlational analyses showed concurrent validity of the 
BSAWS construct with other previously established measures 
of anxiety, paranoia and emotional regulation. 
 
The BSAWS scale makes a novel contribution to the literature 
as it permits an understanding of individual experiences and 
responses during specific tasks.  The scale could therefore be 
used for example to explore people’s experiences during a 
range of very different tasks and behaviours, such as eating 
behaviours, or during physical tasks, as well as interoceptive 
tasks similar to the one used within the present study. 
   MEANS, SDS AND CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES USED IN STUDY 
 
 
 Bivariate correlations 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Trait Neuroticism 12.19 4.13 --          
2 Trait Unconcern 18.47 5.10 .19 --         
3 State Worry 8.56 4.20 .48** -.11 --        
4 State Mindfulness 9.69 4.05 .13 .12 .22 --       
5 Positive Affect 22.47 7.14 .12 -.10 .14 .39** --      
6 Negative Affect 15.50 6.16 .39** -.17 .41*** .09 -.72*** --     
7 Cognitive Reappraisal 30.23 6.69 -.25 -.29* -.24 -.39** -.31** -.08 --    
8 State Paranoia 15.06 8.12 .31** -.14 .57** .06 .16 .53 -.24 --   
9 Paranoia Frequency 31.34 14.01 .25* -.06 .53*** .09 .29* .50 -.23 .71*** --  
10 Paranoia Conviction 38.26 19.73 .13 .15 .36** .10 .21 .37 -.44** .49*** .68*** -- 
11 Paranoia Distress 22.27 17.64 -.25* -.02 .53*** .13 .29* .43 -.24 .50*** .60*** .46*** 
*p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Most similar scales have considered the relationship between 
concern and worry with bodily sensations and anxiety alone, 
however this study also considers the relationship with 
paranoid cognitions, i.e. how ‘threatening’ they experience 
external phenomena to be – a sense of lack of ‘rightness’ to 
situations in general.  The current study’s findings support 
previous research linking worry, trait neuroticism and trait 
paranoia [27,33]. 
 
This measure has potential clinical implications.  It could be 
used to look at the aetiology of health anxiety and also 
paranoid cognitions, by examining how individuals experience 
specific situations on a state-by-state basis and relating this 
experience to trait dimensions. 
Future validation of this measure would benefit from 
increased sample sizes as well as sampling within clinical 
populations such as individuals with hypochondriac disorders, 
individuals with generalised anxiety disorder and individuals 
with both paranoid and/or somatic delusional disorders. 
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